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International Journal ersonal Studies, 32(1), 2013, pp. 43-50 
This paper introduces the topic of ethno-epistemology with regards to transpersonal experiences. 
The distinction between polyphasic and monophasic cultures is introduced and the interaction 
between a society’s world view and individual transpersonal experience is explained using the cycle of 
meaning model. A link to philosophical work on “natural epistemology” is made and the importance 
of the “projectability” of cultural theories of experience is discussed. The individual contributions to 
this special section of the journal are introduced.
The literature in transpersonal anthropology extends back into the 19th century, and is rich in the range of transpersonal experiences 
described among the planet’s cultures (see Campbell 
& Staniford, 1978; Laughlin, 1989, 1994a; Laughlin, 
McManus, & Shearer, 1983; Peters, 1994, 1996; 
Schroll, 2011; Schroll & Schwartz, 2005; LaHood, 
2007; Gaffin, 2012). Transpersonal anthropology is 
the cross-cultural study of transpersonal experiences, 
including the sociocultural evocation, interpretation, 
and utility of transpersonal experiences, and their 
involvement in defining social roles. Of particular 
concern for anthropologists is the various ways rituals 
and psychoactive substances are used to encourage 
and evoke transpersonal experiences, and how these 
experiences are integrated into their social identity. 
Holocultural research1 has shown that the vast majority 
of the 4000-plus human societies seek altered states 
of consciousness (ASC) and integrate information 
obtained about themselves and the world from these 
experiences into their world view (Bourguignon, 1973, 
2003; Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977). My group has 
called such peoples polyphasic cultures (see Laughlin, 
this volume)—cultures in which both the world view 
and the individual’s identity are specifically informed 
from experiences in ASCs (i.e., dreaming, visions, drug 
trips, rituals, and ordeals, etc.). Polyphasic cultures are 
significantly different from monophasic cultures of the 
sort that is typical of modern, materialistic, technocratic 
societies like the Euro-American-Aussie one, as well as 
modern industrial Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian 
societies. Monophasic cultures are those that privilege 
experiences had in what is called “normal waking states” 
as opposed to “alternative states” such as dreaming, 
Epistemological, metaphysical and axiological continuity must be in harmony if we are to have a coherent naturalistic 
picture of the world as well as human end-seeking and activity within it.
    —Maffie, 1990, p. 290
It should be possible to formulate more explicitly the necessary and sufficient conditions that make a human existence 
possible and which account for the distinctive quality of human experience.
               —Hallowell, 1967, pp. vii-viii
Keywords: alternative states of consciousness, reality, ethno-epistemology, brain, 
natural epistemology, experience-near
Introduction to Special Topic Section on 
TRANSPERSONAL ANTHROPOLOGY











  Axis of                             Interpretation
             A









Figure 1. The Cycle of Meaning. Individual experiences arise as a consequence of social activities that derive their meaning 
from the society’s world view. Activities lead to direct experiences (incubated dreams, visions, drug trips, etc.) that are then 
interpreted in accordance with the world view. Experience functions to vivify and verify the world view, and instantiate the 
symbolic materials presented in the social activities. In the case of truly novel experiences, the interpretation may result in an 
alteration of the world view and the meanings of its constituent symbolism.
visions, drug trips, ritual enactments, and so forth. 
Monophasic culture is correlated with a materialistic 
world view. All monophasic societies, however, retain 
elements or sub-cultures that tend toward the polyphasic, 
and all were once entirely polyphasic in their pre-modern 
world views and practices.
The Cycle of Meaning
Engagement in ASCs among traditional peoples almost never occurs outside a social context. 
Rather, the emphasis is upon integration of individual 
experiences within a social process that has elsewhere 
been modeled as a cycle of meaning (see Figure 1).
 Take for example a typical dream incubation 
situation (see Laughlin, 2011, pp. 221-231). A person is 
seeking guidance from ancestors, spirits, or gods, and 
travels to a special place where she prepares herself by 
purification and other rituals (often under the guidance 
of a priest), dons special clothing, prays, then sleeps in a 
sacred place (a grove, cave, so forth) and upon waking, 
relates her dream to the priest who helps her interpret 
the meaning of the dream(s) relative to both the 
problem she is seeking to solve, and her culture’s world 
view. However, the experience and its interpretation 
relate to her individual problem, the process has both 
instantiated her world view in direct experience (e.g., she 
has been visited by a revered ancestor from the City of 
the Dead), and she has gained real-life experience that 
becomes part of the meaning of her culture’s sacred 
symbolism in her own mind. By direct experience I 
mean what Kohut (1978/2011, pp. 268-271; see also 
Kohut & Goldberg, 1984) termed “experience-near” 
as opposed to “experience-distant”. The difference 
is one of relative abstraction from direct, immediate 
experience. As Geertz (2000, p. 57) noted, “love” is 
experience-near, while “object-cathexis” is experience-
distant. If, as sometimes happens, her experience is 
perceived by herself or the priest as novel, it may lead to 
a transformation of the meaning of symbolic material 
and thus the world view. This is the kind of cultural 
transformation that anthropologist Wallace (1956, 
1966) called “revitalization”. McGee (2012) offered 
a marvelous example among the people of Haiti of 
the positive feedback that may occur between dream 
experiences and the people’s world view. As he wrote, 
“Dreams are vital sources of liturgical novelty in Haitian 
Vodou—and this novelty is, itself, an underdescribed 
and understudied quality that the religion possesses” (p. 
83).
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Natural Epistemology 
and Ethno-Epistemology
While anthropologists have recorded a vast amount of information about transpersonal experiences 
and sociocultural systems, they have almost always done 
so by describing local folk beliefs as related to them 
by host elders and religious/ritual practitioners (e.g., 
Grindal,  1983; Harner, 1973; Lederman, 1988; Long, 
1976). The emphasis has usually been on what people 
believe—what people claim to know about themselves, 
others, and the world around them. In other words, 
anthropologists are generally satisfied in asking about a 
people’s ethno-ontology.  They rarely go on to ask about 
the people’s ethno-epistemology—that is, how do people 
come to know what they claim to know. Returning to the 
hypothetical dream incubation scenario related above, 
our dream-seeker comes from a group of people who 
believe that ancestors, spirits, gods, and so forth inhabit 
a spiritual domain which, among other places, includes a 
City of the Dead. This is an ethno-ontological description 
referring to the society’s world view—their belief system. 
Yet the description does not tell us how the people come 
to know that there is a spirit world, that they may access 
that world in dreams, and obtain information from such 
encounters of use during waking consciousness.
Rule of Multiple Interpretations
 It helps here to understand that any direct 
experience is open to multiple interpretations. In 
other words, abstracting meaning from experience is 
an interpretive (hermeneutic) process. This is the case 
regardless of the experience (transpersonal or otherwise) 
or the culture from which the experiencer belongs. Put 
negatively, the rule of multiple interpretations states: There 
is no such thing as an experience or an intuition that admits 
of one and only one interpretation (Laughlin, 1994b; 
Laughlin, 2011, p. 489). Following is an example of this 
rule. Barbara Tedlock (1992) told an interesting story 
about her husband, Dennis Tedlock, who had a dream 
while in the field among the Quiché Maya.  He dreamt 
“of receiving an ear of corn from an unknown person at 
a party; when he opened the husk the corn was already 
roasted, with butter, salt, lime juice, and chili powder 
on it” (pp. 105-106).  He did not eat the corn, however. 
Tedlock realized that had her husband reported that 
dream to a Zuni interpreter with whom they had 
previously done research, it would have been viewed as a 
very bad omen: that he would die if not treated to avoid a 
drastic outcome.  However, instead of a Zuni interpreter, 
he reported his dream to a Quiché interpreter. He was 
told it was a good dream, but that the next time he 
dreamed of receiving a gift of food from an ancestor 
spirit, he should eat it immediately. Interpretations of 
the same material may vary widely across cultures, and 
perhaps even among different interpreters within a single 
society. 
Natural Epistemology
 Much of Western academic metaphysics 
is inapplicable to cross-cultural situations; this is 
for several reasons. In the first place, they are often 
armchair ruminations without empirically-supportable 
hypotheses.  In the second place, these ruminations 
are ethnocentric, linked to Western values and ways of 
knowing. In the third place, most are uninformed by 
the natural sciences, especially evolutionary biology and 
neuroscience. In the fourth place, the assumptions of 
professional metaphysicians may be of an a priori nature 
that is unrelated either to empirical science or more 
traditional notions in other cultures. However, one of the 
more useful formulations coming out of philosophical 
thought has been an increasing call for naturalizing 
epistemology (Goldman, 1992, 1999; Devitt, 1991; 
Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991; Maffie, 1990, 1991, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002). According to philosopher of science Maffie 
(1999):
Naturalists reject epistemology as First Philosophy, 
[that is] as an autonomous a priori enterprise prior 
to and normative for all other inquiry. They propose 
instead an epistemology that is continuous with 
science: one conducted within science, as part 
of science. Naturalists endeavor to create such 
continuity by extending the epistemology of the 
sciences (i.e. their a posteriori evidential practices) as 
well as the substantive findings of science into the 
epistemology of epistemology. (p. 23)
A naturalized epistemology is one that is open to the 
empirical study of how the acquisition of knowledge 
actually occurs, as well as how people conceptualize 
such acquisition. As Maffie suggested, the study of 
epistemology may extend to people across cultures. 
Indeed, Maffie (2002) himself analyzed the epistemology 
of the Nahuatl-speaking cultures of Mexico during 
the 16th century. In testing Goldman’s (1992, 1999) 
notion of veritism (that all people everywhere seek 
knowledge and relate language-based, descriptive, and 
conceptual knowledge to the truth), Maffie showed that 
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the presumption of veritism—that people everywhere 
rationally judge the truth of statements by their 
correspondence to facts—like so many other notions in 
Western philosophy, is ethnocentric and a projection of 
Western values upon another, alien culture.
Transpersonal Experience 
and Nelson Goodman’s “Projectability”
 One of the most valuable notions coming out 
of naturalistic epistemology—and the closest view 
I have yet found in philosophy to my own multiple 
interpretation rule—is Goodman’s (1973, Ch. 4) 
projectability characteristic of scientific theories:
A hypothesis will be said to be actually projected when 
it is adopted after some of its instances have been 
examined and determined to be true, and before 
the rest have been examined. The hypothesis need 
not be true, or lawlike, or even reasonable; for we 
are speaking here not of what ought to be projected 
but of what is in fact projected. Moreover, we are not 
concerned with the question whether a hypothesis is 
projected in the tenseless sense that there is some past, 
present or future time at which it is projected.We are 
concerned at any given time only with projections 
that have already been made. (pp. 87-88)
As Boyd (1984) put it, “given any finite body of data, 
there are infinitely many different general theories that 
are logically consistent with those data” (p. 57). Of course 
Boyd is a constructivist and would have one believe there 
is no way to evaluate which theory that fits the facts 
should be accepted. It is all a matter of “paradigms”, to use 
Kuhn’s (1974) term. However, that is an issue for another 
time, and one that does not diminish in any way the 
utility of projectability as a characteristic of scientific or 
cultural theories, and, more importantly for ethnological 
purposes, the hermeneutics of transpersonal experiences. 
Projectability is inherent in any living cycle of meaning, 
and is part of the axes of interpretation and instantiation. 
When reading Tonkinson’s description (this volume) of 
the relations between individual experience and The 
Dreaming among Australian Aborigines, there is a 
perfect example of the timeless nature of projectability 
as noted by Goodman, and how projectability operates 
to maintain the Aboriginal cycle of meaning.
Put in more neuropsychological terms, it is 
precisely the nature of the brain to develop an internal 
reality model (or cognitive map) that derives from and 
in turn is projected back upon direct experiences.  Any 
moment of conscious experience is a neurophysiological 
act which melds sensory input and cognitive models 
(Laughlin, McManus, & D’Aquili, 1990, pp. 28-29). 
Perceptual/cognitive models inform the experience 
precisely because they are projectable upon patterns of 
sensory input. Obviously, any number of alternative 
models can be projected onto any given set of sensory 
data (hence the rule of multiple interpretations above), 
and that is when culture may, and usually does, influence 
experience. 
The term “transpersonal” is often bandied 
about as a catch-all term for every kind of extraordinary 
experience.  Yet if we use the term in its more technical 
sense, and define transpersonal experience as any 
experience that transcends ego expectations—this calls 
a person’s identity into question because of dissonance 
between what was once thought about oneself and one’s 
well-ordered world and what one is actually experiencing 
(Walsh & Vaughan, 1980)—then it follows that an 
experience that is transpersonal for one person may 
not be transpersonal for another. The experience may 
produce ego-changing dissonance in the former person 
and fail to do so for the latter. This is particularly 
relevant when considering the nature of transpersonal 
experience across cultures. If one is raised in a polyphasic 
culture to expect encounters with “other-than-human 
persons” (Hallowell, 2002, p. 20) such as ghosts, sprites, 
gods, ancestors, et cetera, then such encounters may 
not cause dissonance. However, if one is raised in a 
Western technocratic and monophasic society in which 
one is taught to disbelieve in such encounters, then such 
an experience might be “mind-blowing”, so to speak. 
Transpersonal experience thus has a lot to do with what 
a person’s world view prepares her or him to project upon 
potentially transpersonal experience.
What is found among polyphasic peoples is 
that they typically have cultures that incorporate a 
transpersonal cycle of meaning. That is, not only do 
the people mount symbolic and ritual methods for 
evoking transpersonal experiences, they also provide 
interpretations, or perhaps models, that are easily 
projectable onto whatever experiences arise during the 
process. If one speaks in tongues, that is because one is 
filled with the Holy Spirit. If one dreams of a conversation 
with a long-dead Aunt Lucy, then it is because one 
aunt has traveled from the City of the Dead to impart 
important information. Such experiences instantiate 
the cultural theory, because the cultural theory is easily 
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projectable onto the experience. This is the root of all 
real-life, everyday hermeneutics.
There is no clearer example of projectability than 
the attribution of meaning onto the landscape. Devereux 
(this volume) offers a wonderful survey of the many 
sacred sites around the world that derive their meaning 
in part because they are simulacra—features that remind 
local people of elements in their mythology. A mountain 
ridge is seen as a sleeping chief, a rock feature is seen 
as a bleeding vulva, a rock bears the resemblance to a 
buffalo. What one projects upon such features is heavily 
determined by one’s culture. There is a famous rock 
formation in New Mexico known in English as Shiprock, 
from which the town of Shiprock takes its name. As one 
gazes at this geological feature, driving toward it from the 
east, it does resemble an old sailing ship to Western eyes. 
But the Navajo long ago projected a bird wing onto that 
same formation and named it Tse’Bit’Ai, or “rock with 
wings”. The Navajo understand that the bird itself and 
its other wing are underground and hence hidden from 
sight, while Westerners see the feature entirely above 
ground—a sailing ship plying the sea. This difference in 
projection and interpretation is significant relative to the 
two cultures’ very different world views.
Experience: 
The Root of Ethno-Epistemology
The task we six anthropologists set for ourselves for this special section was to think about how various 
peoples come to know what they claim to know with 
respect to transpersonal experiences. Of course people in 
all cultures know a lot of things simply because they were 
taught them. They believe because that is the way their 
worldview tells them to believe. Most Westerners believe 
the Earth rotates around the sun, and that microscopic 
creatures produce disease, and these things are believed 
because they were taught. However, our question is more 
refined. We want to know the influence of transpersonal 
experience—experience that is, by definition, 
transformative in some way—on the beliefs of people, 
and how those beliefs anticipate, set-up, encourage, evoke 
and offer interpretations of extraordinary experiences. 
This question is much harder to answer by reading 
much of the ethnography of religious and spiritual 
experiences. There are excellent exceptions, of course, 
and these are almost always written by anthropologists 
that have had transpersonal experiences themselves (see, 
e.g., Bharati, 1975; Furst, 1976; George, 1995; Goulet, 
1998; Goulet & Miller, 2007; Grindal, 1983; Harner, 
1973; Krippner & Friedman, 2010; Lederman, 1988; 
Long, 1976; Winkelman, 2010; Young & Goulet, 1994). 
Methodologically speaking, there really is no alternative 
for the ethnographic fieldworker but to open herself up 
to potentially transformative experiences (Laughlin, 
1989).
 Implied in this methodology is the core answer 
to our question about ethno-epistemology. As each 
contributor in his or her own way confirms, the roots 
of local transpersonal knowledge are grounded in direct 
experience. Some may receive knowledge via tradition, 
but people everywhere, especially in polyphasic societies, 
believe in the spiritual domain precisely because 
they experience its reality. A thing is true because I 
experience it to be real. In this volume, I discuss the 
phenomenology of dreaming and show why one might 
reach the conclusion that, not just waking consciousness 
but all states of consciousness are real. Moreover, I make 
the point that experiences had in ASCs make available 
potentially transformative information to the dreamer 
and quite often to the community (see also McGee, 
2012). Tonkinson (this volume) takes us among the 
Mardu Aboriginies who live in Australia’s Western 
Desert region. The Mardu people see themselves as 
conduits of information between the timeless Dreaming 
and the everyday life of the community. Because they are 
able to leave their corporeal bodies at night and travel 
long distances to engage with Dreamtime spirits, ASCs 
are the source of creativity and transformation in both 
culture and social identity. The grounding of reality in 
a timeless mythopoeic spiritual domain is not limited 
to traditional ontologies, but is also reflected in modern 
physics of the sort Bohm (1980) described. Schroll (this 
volume) encapsulates Bohm’s thinking about what 
he called the “implicate order” of physical realty. The 
implicate order is, like the Dreamtime, a timeless domain 
that makes possible an understanding of how there may 
be a continuum from mind to matter. Is it possible that 
traditional epistemologies of people everywhere intuit the 
truth of the implicate order, and thus almost inevitably 
see everything as ontologically entangled in a vast whole?
Recognizing that polyphasic peoples do in fact 
consider their worldviews as grounded in experienced 
reality, and that confirmation of this contention involves 
direct and transpersonal engagement with the world, 
Glass-Coffin (this volume)—like Turner (1996) before 
her—raises the obvious question: Why do so many 
anthropologists and other transpersonal researchers 
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fail to take our hosts’ descriptions of “other-than-
human sentience” seriously? All too often ethnographic 
presentations of these important descriptions are 
couched in constructivist (relativist) narratives that 
allow the researcher to implicitly disavow the fact 
that these are lived realities to the people having those 
experiences. Why else would people take such interest 
in sacred places, like those described for us by Devereux 
(this volume)?  Not only that, but why else go to such 
extreme efforts to construct elaborate megalithic and 
spiritual centers like Stonehenge? The power that people 
describe for such sacred places is, once again, grounded 
in direct experience, and hence considered as part—
indeed, a very pivotal part—of reality.  As Devereux 
notes, and as Winkelman (this volume) also emphasizes, 
many of these elements, both material and spiritual, 
are part of the many shamanic traditions across the 
planet. Shamanistic practices in a sense involve a social 
maximization of the ability to enter ASCs and engage 
with the other-than-human beings, cosmic power, 
spiritual insights, and healing potential available to those 
who can access alternative realities.
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